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Christine Clavien
Kitcher's Revolutionary Reasoning Inversion
in Ethics∗
Abstract: This paper examines three speciﬁc issues raised by The Ethical Project. First,
I discuss the varieties of altruism and spell out the diﬀerences between the deﬁnitions
proposed by Kitcher and the ways altruism is usually conceived in biology, philosophy,
psychology, and economics literature. Second, with the example of Kitcher's account, I
take a critical look at evolutionary stories of the emergence of human ethical practices.
Third, I point to the revolutionary implications of the Darwinian methodology when
it is thoughtfully applied to ethics.
1. Introduction
Ethics emerges as a human phenomenon, permanently unﬁnished.
We, collectively, made it up, and have developed, reﬁned, and dis-
torted it, generation by generation. Ethics should be understood as
a projectthe ethical projectin which we have been engaged for
most of our history as a species. (EP, 2)
As revealed by this introductory sentence, Philip Kitcher is one of the few
philosophers who take the implications of the Darwinian revolution for moral
theory at face value. He does not simply ﬁt his theory to a preconception of
human nature, but adapts his thoughts to human evolution. The latter is a rad-
ically diﬀerent approach since evolution is an on-going process and thus calls for
scepticism regarding ﬁxed views on what human nature is supposed to be.
At least three key messages are contained in The Ethical Project. First,
ethics is tightly linked to altruism in a way that Kitcher aims to clarify. Second,
the roots of ethics are to be found in our evolutionary past and some of its
crucial elements can be observed in our near cousins, the great apes. Third, the
descriptive analysis of human ethical practices has important implications for
other areas of ethics. In what follows, I propose to take up these three topics.
First, regarding Kitcher's treatment of altruism, I'll make an attempt to clarify
some elements that might be misunderstood by his readers. Second, I'll voice
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some reservations about Kitcher's evolutionary account of ethics. Third, I'll
highlight one truly revolutionary aspect of Kitcher's `ethical project': a reasoning
inversion that has important implications for metaethics, normative ethics and
practical ethics.
2. Kitcher's Account of Altruism Contrasted
One essential building block of Kitcher's `ethical project' is altruism. Altruism is
an ambiguous term because it is used in many disciplines (i.e. biology, philosophy,
economics) and given diﬀerent meanings depending on the theoretical contexts in
which it is embedded. This proliferation of meanings is particularly problematic
for researchers interested in a naturalistic account of human ethical practices
because all these diﬀerent concepts of altruism may be integrated into such an
account, each playing a diﬀerent explanatory role.
In order to avoid conceptual confusion, Kitcher begins his book with useful
distinctions between three ways of understanding altruism, which he labels bi-
ological altruism, behavioural altruism, and psychological altruism. These three
deﬁnitions help him to pinpoint the exact levels at which experimental data and
scientiﬁc theories can be recruited in his `ethical project'. As such they are nec-
essary theoretical working tools. However, we should resist the temptation to
assume that these deﬁnitions correspond closely to how altruism is conceived in
the diﬀerent ﬁelds that have traditionally dealt with altruism.
Firstly, Kitcher's psychological altruism is far richer and more diﬀerentiated
than the characterization typically used in psychological and philosophical lit-
erature. Philosophers usually frame the debate around psychological altruism
within the framework of a commonsense `belief-desire psychology'. An action is
produced by a single causal chain, starting with a primary desire which deter-
mines whether the action earns the altruistic label: only other-directed primary
desires confer altruistic status on the whole action (Stich et al. 2010; Clavien
2012). This picture of human motivation ignores many relevant aspects of other-
regarding motives, such as the role of caring and empathic emotions, or the fact
that one can be more or less disposed to help others depending on various dimen-
sions (e.g. physical distance, level of personal investment). In contrast, Kitcher
integrates these elements into his account of psychological altruism. For him,
altruism is a capacity to align one's motivational states of mind more closely
with others' wants and needs: When you come to see that what you do will
aﬀect other people, the wants you have, the emotions you feel, the intentions you
form, change from what they would have been in the absence of that recogni-
tion. (EP, 20) According to this view, two versions of psychological altruism are
possible: emotional altruism (discussed on pages 2530), which might be found
in diﬀerent animal species, and what one might call desire altruism (discussed on
pages 2123), a cognitively more demanding form that is about the modiﬁcation
of desires. Kitcher also considers altruism a multidimensional phenomenon that
depends on factors such as the `intensity' of one's response to others, the `range'
of those towards whom we are prepared to respond altruistically, the `scope' of
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contexts in which one is disposed to respond, the `discernment' in appreciating
the consequences for others, and the `empathetic skill' in identifying the desires
others have or the predicaments in which they ﬁnd themselves (discussed on
pages 3134). By spelling out these various aspects of psychological altruism,
Kitcher makes a break with philosophical tradition, further enriching his analysis
with inputs from empirical studies on humans and social animals.
Secondly, Kitcher's characterization of biological altruism does not corre-
spond to the use of this word among the most prominent biologists working
on altruism.1 For Kitcher, an organism A is biologically altruistic toward a
beneﬁciary B just in case A acts in ways that decrease its own reproductive
success and increase the reproductive success of B (EP, 18). This deﬁnition
does not impose a decrease in reproductive success over the individual's whole
lifetime. Thus, a disposition to give up something in situations where the agent
is likely to receive a greater gain in exchange in subsequent encounters earns the
altruism label. One famous example is `reciprocal altruism', a form of cooper-
ative behaviour that is beneﬁcial in the long-term described by Robert Trivers
(1971). It is important to note, however, that this form of behaviour does not
exemplify altruism in the classical sense, deﬁned by William Hamilton when he
developed his kin selection theory (1964), and shared by most contemporary
biologists working on altruism (Frank 1998; Grafen 1985; Lehmann/Keller 2006;
West et al. 2007; Lehmann et al. 2006). For these researchers, altruism refers
to a behaviour that permanently decreases the actor's reproductive success and
increases other organisms reproductive success; that is, the number of oﬀspring
is calculated at the end of the organisms' lives (Clavien/Chapuisat 2012). In
this much more restrictive sense, helping behaviour that pays oﬀ in the long
run cannot be considered altruistic. Conceptual clariﬁcation is important here
because I fear that Kitcher's deﬁnition of biological altruism serves as vector for
perpetuating a misunderstanding that is frequent in the humanities and social
sciences. Scholars are often unaware that Trivers (1971) and Hamilton (1964)
did not discuss the same biological phenomenon in their seminal papers; hav-
ing heard of Trivers' theory (and having often misunderstood Hamilton's, which
requires basic knowledge of population genetics), these scholars infer that biolo-
gists deny the possibility of any form of individually costly helping behaviour.2
I hope to have made it clear that this conclusion is mistaken.
Thirdly, how well Kitcher's behavioural altruism matches the way economics
conceives altruism is a more delicate question, since economists themselves do
not seem to be clear on this point (more on this topic in Clavien/Chapuisat
forthcoming). According to Kitcher (EP, 23):
Behavioral altruists are people who look like psychological altruists.
That is, they perform the actions people with psychologically altru-
istic desires would have been led to perform. In ascribing behavioral
altruism, however, we do not suppose any particular psychological
1 Unfortunately, Kitcher is ambiguous on this point (see EP, 18 and 49).
2 Note that Kitcher himself does not make this error, despite the fact that he groups the
two distinct phenomena under the same broad deﬁnition of altruism.
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explanation of the actions. Perhaps they are indeed the products of
psychologically altruistic desires, or perhaps the actions are produced
by [. . . ] a desire for status, or for feeling oneself in accordance with
some socially approved pattern of conduct, or even a self-interested
calculation.
This description seems to refer to traditional neoclassical theory in economics
which ascribes utility functions to humans as a way of making predictions about
their behaviour: it is assumed that people behave so as to maximize their utility
function. A utility function is an axiomatic way to represent people's long-
standing and hierarchically ranked revealed preferences. Revealed preferences
capture stable patterns of choices. For instance, if subjects reliably prefer more
monetary units over less monetary units, they reveal a preference for increasing
monetary income. Thus at least part of their utility is to increase monetary
income.
However, this way of modeling human choices does not make strong assup-
tions about the subjective preferences underlying revealed preferences. For in-
stance, by choosing to increase their income, subjects might desire more money,
or they might be motivated by a desire to follow a social rule; the theory does
not discriminate between these (or other) possibilities. As the economist Ken
Binmore points out,
All that is necessary for the theory to apply is that people behave
consistently. It can then be shown that they necessarily behave as
though maximizing the expected value of something, whether they
are intending to or not. Whatever this abstract something may be
in a particular context, we call it utility. (Binmore 2005, 65)
Thus, Kitcher's behavioural altruists show other-directed revealed preferences,
although it is not clear which intimate motives lie behind these preferences (long
term self-interested calculation, genuine desire to help others, etc.).
In recent years, however, things have become less clear with the emergence of
behavioural and experimental economics. Scholars in these research ﬁelds3 still
contribute to the elaboration of long-standing and hierarchically ranked prefer-
ences as indicators for actual decision-making. But, in addition, they also tend
to deﬁne these preferences in a more realistic way; these preferences are more
or less explicitly assumed to represent meaningfully what happens in humans'
minds while they make their choices. Consequently, these scholars propose re-
ﬁning the utility function by adding more diﬀerentiated preferences than the
standard preference for monetary gain used in most economics models. For
example, if other-directed behaviour is observed in laboratory money games,
behavioural and experimental economists incorporate a taste for fairness in the
utility function they attribute to humans (Fehr/Gächter 2002; 2005); similarly, if
it is observed that subjects who decide to apply costly punishment against free-
riding also show activation of a brain area known to correlate with expectation
3 Note that it is precisely to these research ﬁelds that Kitcher refers while discussing `be-
havioral altruism' (EP, 45).
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of reward, a taste for revenge or for warm glow of being a caretaker of justice is
added in the utility function (de Quervain et al. 2004). In principle, there is no
limit to how many preferences can be introduced (and hierarchized) in a utility
function. The more complex and ﬁne-tuned it becomes, the more likely it cor-
rectly describes the real motivational mechanisms underlying decision making.4
We can see here that there is a very thin line demarcating observed preferences
(as simple predictors for action) from subjective preferences (as correct descrip-
tions of individuals' private motives). In the literature, it is not always easy
to identify whether this line has been crossed or not (Calvien/Chapuisat forth-
coming), especially since the increasing use of novel neuroimaging technologies
that are meant to provide a glimpse into people's private minds (Clavien/Klein
2010).
To illustrate this ambiguity, it is worth comparing how Kitcher and economics-
minded authors formalize altruism. Kitcher proposes a simpliﬁed formalization
of psychological altruism (in contrast to behavioural altruism). His idea is to
represent people's subjective preferences using real numbers that correspond to
how much they value a given outcome. As he explains (EP, 24):
The numbers assigned in my social desires would be given by the
simple equation:
vSoc = wEgo vSol + wAlt vBen
where vSoc measures my social desires, vSol my solitary desires, vBen
the measurements of desire I attribute to the beneﬁciary (you), and
wEgo and wAlt the weights given to my solitary desires and my attri-
butions of desire values to you (so that wEgo + wAlt = 1).
Here, wAlt can be conceived as the degree of altruism. Interestingly, some authors
from economics provide strikingly similar formalizations for altruistic behaviour.
They build utility functions that contain social and other-regarding incentives
and explicitly oppose them to self-directed (including so called `warm-glow')
utility functions. For example, Mayr et al. (2009) construct a function as the
sum of the actor's welfare and the welfare for the poor weighted by an other-
regarding factor. This idea can be formalized with the following equation:
u1(x) = w1(x) + β w2(x)
where u1(x) describes the actor's utility (that is, how much she values the out-
come of the action x), w1(x) the actor's welfare if action x is performed, w2(x)
the welfare for the poor if action x is performed, and β how much the actor cares
for the welfare of others (if β = 0, she has no other-regarding preference). Here,
β can also be conceived as the degree of altruism.
Similarly, in an analysis of the evolutionary stability of other-regarding pref-
erences in two person interactions, Akçay et al. (2009) propose representing `how
much an individual `likes' a given outcome' (u1(x)) as the product of her own
4 However, one drawback that prevents many economists from developing complex utility
functions is the lack of predictive power of functions composed of multiple variables.
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payoﬀ and her partner's payoﬀ weighted by an other-regarding factor. This idea
can be formalized with:
u1(x) = w1(x) w2(x)
β
where w1(x) is the actor's payoﬀ if action x is performed, w2(x) is the second
player's payoﬀ if action x is performed, and β measures the `degree of the other-
regarding preference' of the actor for her partner (if β = 0, she has no other-
regarding preference). Here again, β seems to be a measure for how much
individuals are disposed to `adjust their preferences to align them more closely
with what they take to be the wishes of others', which is the major requirement
for Kitcher's psychological altruism (EP, 56).
The main diﬀerences between Kitcher's formalization and the two subsequent
ones are: a) Kitcher's equation is composed of absolute values instead of func-
tions; b) the left-hand side of Kitcher's equation (vSoc, i.e. actor's social desire)
is less explicitly predictive of behaviour than the utility concept in economics
(u1); c) the right-hand side of Kitcher's equation is explicitly meant to describe
individuals' subjective evaluation of a given outcome (vSol, vBen, i.e. actor's soli-
tary desire or desire attributed to the beneﬁciary) instead of the objective value
of a given outcome (w1, w2, i.e. individuals' welfare or payoﬀ). However, it is
easy to transform Kitcher's equation into a functional one without distorting his
message.
vSoc(x) = wEgo vSol (x) + wAlt vBen(x)
Moreover, if we add the assumptions (usual when building models) that people
act upon their desires and evaluate the situation correctly, we end up with the
following formula:
u1(x) = (1-β)w1(x) + βw2(x)
(where 0 ≤ β ≥ 1), and the three equations can be directly compared.
From these examples, we can see how diﬃcult it can be to distinguish between
objective and subjective preferences, and consequently, between psychological
altruism (which represents the actor's real motives for action) and behavioural
altruism (which represents the actor's observable behaviour).
3. Examining Kitcher's View of the Evolution of Ethics
Taking a historical perspective, Kitcher claims that ethical practices result from
a capacity that has been linearly and gradually acquired on a speciﬁc branch
of the phylogenetic tree: the one with humans as its most recent shoot. In the
early stages, our hominid ancestors displayed altruistic abilities. These basic
(mostly emotional) forms of psychological altruism were able to evolve in the
ﬁrst place thanks to the mechanism of parental care. Some great apes, whose
ancestors diverged from hominids ﬁve million (or more) years ago, also seem to
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possess these basic altruistic abilities. Thus some of our present day evolution-
ary cousins share the essential components of ethics with us, while we humans
have developed new features, among which the most important is the capacity
for normative guidance. The latter is an essential element for initiation of the
`ethical project': it is the capacity to recognize a rule as a `command'.
It is worth emphasizing that Kitcher does not conﬂate the phenomenon of al-
truism with ethics (EP, 134). As he writes, [a] central theme of my approach to
altruism is that there are preethical forms of altruism and that these are realized
in animals who have not yet acquired ethical practice (EP, 44). Psychological
altruism becomes `ethically charged' only with the aid of normative guidance.
Normative guidance enables altruism to transcend its original domain, originally
restricted to close kin, and extend to a broader range.5 This expansion has an
evolutionary rationale for the human species; it is an adaptive response to `al-
truism failures' that preclude peaceful living in large communities: The tension
and fragilities of hominid (and chimpanzee) social life arise from the limited
altruism of the participants. (EP, 222)6
Kitcher's scenario is plausible. It is widely accepted among evolutionary the-
orists that slight changes in genetic makeup can produce important phenotypical
eﬀects such as new capacities or behavioural propensities. This is especially true
when the slight changes aﬀect neural connections involved in higher order cog-
nitive abilities. Thus, with respect to ethics, humans might be the only species
that has undergone the minor but necessary change that has cascaded into the
capacity to take an ethical attitude. Possibly, this minor change consisted in
recruiting and linking together several preexisting mechanisms as a way of re-
sponding eﬃciently to altruism failures.
However, as Patricia Churchland points out in her latest book (2011, chap. 5),
there is a plethora of competing selection theories to explain the origin of human
ethical practices, and there is no criteria that allows one to rule any of them out
completely. To illustrate this point, consider Kitcher's project of emphasizing
the role of psychological altruism. His idea is that ethical practices grew out of
human capacities for psychological altruism (EP, 46): it is the remedy humans
have evolved to avoid the failures of a basic form of altruism. As far as I can
see, practically, such failures of altruism translate into an incapacity to resolve
the everyday diﬃculties posed by social life in large groups. If the evolutionary
challenge posed to humans was to ﬁnd a solution for facilitating peaceful rela-
tionships among growing circles of people, I hardly see the utility of describing
this situation primarily as a failure of altruism. It might suﬃce to mention the
need to develop more complex forms of mutually beneﬁcial cooperation. Many
compatible but possibly independent solutions have been found for realizing this
5 Much in the vein of Peter Singer's `expanding circle' idea (Singer 1981).
6 This scenario nicely illustrates the fact that evolutionary advantage at the genetic level
(expressed by the fact that a gene successfully transmits copies of itself to the following gen-
erations) and at the individual level (expressed by the fact that an individual is eﬃcient at
producing fully grown oﬀspring) is not to be conﬂated with greediness or egoism in the psycho-
logical sense. There is no contradiction in saying that an individual is moved by other-regarding
motives (psychological level) and that this behaviour is advantageous at some biological level
(gene transmission or individual fecundity).
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task: the expansion of caring feelings toward wider categories of individuals, the
ability to feel some types of social rules as commands, enhanced practical intelli-
gence that makes us aware of the beneﬁts of long-term peaceful interactions, etc.
And lately, some philosophers' post-rationalizations have brought these diﬀerent
phenomena together into the broad category of ethical practice.
It is not my purpose to defend this alternative scenario. Rather, this dis-
cussion is meant to illustrate that it may be hopeless to attempt to provide a
detailed explanation of the evolution of ethics. I tend to agree with Church-
land when she writes that inferring what behavioural traits were selected for
in human evolution cannot be solved by a vivid imagination about the ances-
tral condition plus selected evidence, precisely because this evidence could be
explained in many diﬀerent ways (Churchland 2011, 114).
This reservation apart, I am convinced that Kitcher's most valuable contri-
bution to ethics does not rely on the particular historical scenario developed in
the ﬁrst part of his book. The mere recognition of the domain of ethics as a
product of evolution is an important advancement in moral philosophy. With
such a scientiﬁc approach, ethics can be thought of as one (or a series of) ongoing
adaptive process endowed with a practical function: to help individuals regulate
their social interactions in large groups. It is a fully natural process that has
its roots deep in our ancestral history and many of its component-parts might
be found in other species (especially, but not exclusively, those that are closely
related to us). Thus, descriptive scenarios explaining the origin of ethics in clas-
sical philosophical literature (such as the ones proposed by Nietzsche, Rousseau
or Hobbes) can be seen in the light of evolutionary theory as the equivalent of
ancient geocentric beliefs. The Darwinian turn might not provide answers to all
our questions (we have seen that particular evolutionary accounts are based on
scarce evidence), but it certainly helps to adopt a constructive scientiﬁc view on
descriptive ethics which, in turn, impinges on other domains of ethics. Kitcher
provides a masterful demonstration of this impact in the second and third parts
of his book to which we shall now turn.
4. In Praise of Kitcher's Reasoning Inversion
One of Kitcher's most striking intellectual qualities is his capacity to `bite the
bullet', to take on the consequences of the Darwinian lesson. When needed,
he does not shy away from acknowledging implications that contradict well-
established and respectable views in moral philosophy. For instance, Kitcher
brilliantly captures the devastating implications evolution holds for metaethics.
In the light of scientiﬁc scrutiny, ethical practice is revealed to be a moving
phenomenon intrinsically bound to our evolving biology and culture. This is why
the `ethical project' is a work in progress that constantly needs to be adapted to
new emerging biological needs and cultural conditions. This simple knowledge
about ethical practices makes it clear that there is no mystery or special quality
to ethics, and it smooths the path away from strongly rationalist and realist views
in ethics. In Chapter 5, Kitcher refreshingly shakes up conventional philosophical
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myths such as the existence of an `ethical reality' (something we are supposed
to have contact with thanks to an ethical faculty), the `ethical point of view' (a
point of view in which people give themselves commands that are not external
but somehow their own) or the pure `moral law within.' No one explains better
than he why appeals to divine will, to a realm of values, to faculties of ethical
perception and `pure practical reason' have to go (EP, 4).
Interestingly, Darwinian metaethical implications also weaken the notion of
ethical truth, and with it, the way that ethical progress is traditionally conceived.
Kitcher takes up this topic in Chapter 6 where he provides his most original con-
tribution to ethics. Usually, ethical progress is explained in terms of truth: we
achieve progress each time we have gained more insight into ethical truth. This
deﬁnition does not satisfy Kitcher since there is no ethical truth to `discover'.
He proposes instead to reverse the explanation. The solution is to revise the
concept of progress so it is prior to the notion of truth. (EP, 249) Following this
line of reasoning, he deﬁnes progress in terms of functional eﬃcacy, which is a
desirable thing for human beings. Recall that according to Kitcher's evolution-
ary account, ethical practices have an `original function': to remedy the failures
of altruism that lead to social instability and conﬂict.7 Thus, at its most pro-
gressive, the evolution of ethics is (at least as far as its original function goes) a
series of responses to the most powerful sources of residual social conﬂict (EP,
225). On the basis of this new deﬁnition of ethical progress, it is then possible
to redeﬁne truth: we achieve ethical truth each time we make ethical progress.
There are at least three pleasing upshots of the argumentative inversion sug-
gested by Kitcher. First, it frees ethics from elitism. If ethical progress (and thus
ethical truth) is akin to some form of bargaining solution in complex biological
and social environments, there is no reason to suppose (which is so often done
implicitly under the cover of a respectable rhetoric) that moral philosophers or
some particular wise men have privileged access to ethical truth. Second, it
facilitates the renewing process in metaethics. Strongly rationalist and realist
positions may be given up more readily once it is understood that there is no need
to discover truth in order to make ethical progress. Third, and most importantly,
it reminds us that the most important task facing ethicists is a practical one:
identifying the proper solutions for human failures in everyday social relation-
ships. In the ﬁnal part of his book, Kitcher makes a crucial step by exploring the
normative and practical implications of his theory. He addresses various press-
ing topics such as scarce food resource management, equal treatment of men
and women, and equality of opportunity with regard to novel options oﬀered by
biotechnology. One more lesson to take from The Ethical Project is that ethicists
should not shy away8 from or dismiss practical questions, an attitude which has
produced unfortunate institutional gaps between practical and theoretical ethics
in contemporary universities.
7 This desirable aspect of the function of ethical practices (the fact that they contribute to
smooth social relationships) confers ethical progress with its normative force.
8 As a matter of fact, many contemporary ethicists in philosophy departments avoid making
practical ethical commitments. This is especially true of evolutionary-minded thinkers who
seem intimidated by the tragic history of Social Darwinism (with some notable exceptions, e.g.
Rachels 1990; 2004; Gibbard 1990).
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Daniel Dennett recently gave a talk in which he proposed three major reason-
ing inversions that have been helpful in understanding the evolution of human
competences.9 The ﬁrst reasoning inversion is provided by Darwin when he for-
mulates his theory of evolution by natural selection (Darwin 2003[1859]). Dar-
win's idea helps explain how complex organisms (including their most intimate
mechanisms and faculties) can be produced without knowledge of how to make
themthus without ﬁrst postulating the existence of an intelligent designer.
The second inversion is due to Turing who proposed a similar inversion with re-
spect to computing machines (Turing 1937). With rather simple procedures and
techniques, it is possible to build machines endowed with impressive arithmetic
abilities, although these machines are completely ignorant of what arithmetic
is. Thus, computing eﬃciency does not necessarily imply an understanding of
the task. Putting Darwin and Turing together, it becomes easy to recognize
that a large part of human intelligence has been created blindly and produces
outputs without any prior understanding of the task to be realized. Our brains,
for example, are equipped with a multitude of mechanisms that help individu-
als to cope with complex environments. These mechanisms highlight or ignore
behaviourally relevant information without the mechanisms (and often without
the actors themselves) being conscious of this selection process. The third inver-
sion is due to Hume (1993[1772]), who noticed that we commonly interpret an
inner anticipation as an external cause of a perception. After having captured
associations of events over past experiences, we think that we see causation (say
we see one billiard ball communicating motion to another), when in fact all we
see is succession of events (one billiard ball moving before impact followed by a
second billiard ball moving after impact). Hume argues that we interpret our
subjective expectations formed by associations over time as immediate eﬀects of
a perceptible causal link. In other words, we `project' our impression of causa-
tion onto the objects in much the same way we `project' cuteness onto a baby's
face or sweetness onto honey. But there might be no causality, or at least not
the sort of causality we think we see, between given associated events.
As Dennett writes, these revolutionary reasoning inversions have in common
that they turned everything familiar upside down (2009, 10061). I propose to
add one more thinker to this venerable list: Philip Kitcher, who points to the
fact that we wrongly attribute discovery of ethical truth when what we observe
is practical ethical progress. Putting Kitcher and Hume together, the result
is that the practical ethical commitments we have reached collectively through
painful negotiation are felt by us to be necessities. We then wrongly think that
we have discovered10 an external realm of necessary ethical truth or universal
moral commands that contain these practical ethical commitments.
Interestingly, one might wonder why Kitcher clings to the notion of ethical
truth after having made it so clear that the important aspect of evolving ethics is
9 `A confusion about consciousness', presented at the opening conference for the new
centre of cognitive science at the University of Neuchâtel, 11 January 2012. URL: http://
www2.unine.ch/cognition/confcsc (10.02.2012).
10 In the philosophical literature, there is a variety of ways to interpret this `discovery': we
exert our practical reason, we have the right moral intuitions, we feel the right and the wrong
through our moral emotions, etc.
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the achievement of functional eﬃcacy (what he calls `ethical progress'), and not
the discovery of a truth. Moreover, I have one minor reservation with his analy-
sis (linked to my criticism in the previous section). The function of ethics is not
primarily desirable because it remedies the failures of altruism, but because it
facilitates social relationships. Since many other cognitive and emotional mech-
anisms might contribute to realizing this function, I am not sure why we should
deﬁne ethical progress as the expansion of psychological altruism rather than as
the (more general) increased eﬃciency at regulating one's social interactions in
large groups.
5. Concluding Remarks
One interesting lesson to take from Kitcher's book is that we should read Darwin
along with Plato and Aristotle in introductory ethics courses. In doing so, we
would do well to pay less attention to what Darwin wrote about ethics than to his
general theory of evolution. This background scientiﬁc knowledge is important
for stimulating global reﬂection on ethics. As Kitcher has taught us, this move
would save much intellectual wandering and help us to focus on ethically relevant
topics. The most insightful eﬀorts of ethicists do not have much to do with
discovering ethical truth or grounding ethical codes that everyone should follow.
The truly interesting questions are descriptive and practical ones. First, we
need to acquire a better understanding of the practical function of ethics, the
conditions of its applicability, and the details of its machinery. Second, on the
basis of this factual knowledge, we need to take concrete everyday measures.
The very nature of the evolving `ethical project' demands that we work on it
constantly with the aim to put together the right resources and social conditions
that best ﬁt our needs as an evolved and highly cognitive species.
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